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Replacing CCT with
'best value'
by Christopher Bovis
Following the demise of the compulsory competitive tendering regime, 
Professor Bovis assesses the concept of best value in delivering public 
services. He compares it with its predecessor and elaborates on the 
interrelation between best value and related regimes of public sector 
management.
* ccording to its pre-election manifesto, the Labour 
L\ administration has announced its intention to modernise 
A. Alhe function of Local Government in England and Wales 
(see Modern Local Government In Touch with the People, DETR 
1998) and in particular to evolutionise the system for dispersing 
public services by local authorities and other public bodies (see 
Modernising Local Government   Improving Local Services Through Best 
Value, DETR 1998). The ill-fated compulsory competitive 
tendering (CCT) regime is now due for replacement with a new 
system in public sector management: 'the best value' (see the 
Local Government Bill 1998).
The traditional way in which local authorities and other 
public bodies have delivered public services was based upon 
'benchmarked competition'. By virtue of the Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act 1980 (Part III), the Local Government Act 
1988 (Part I), and certain provisions of the Local Government Act 
1992, a number of public bodies and organisations   including 
local government, police and fire authorities   have been 
required to submit specified activities to compulsory 
competitive tendering. Such an approach was deemed necessary 
in order to safeguard openness and transparency in the delivery 
of public services, but primarily to achieve savings for the public 
purse. It should be mentioned here that along these lines the 
European institutions have already subjected public purchasing 
(i.e. the procurement by central and local government, other 
public bodies and utilities) to a rigorously competitive regime 
specified in the EU public procurement directives for public 
supplies, works and services contracts (respectively, Directive 
93/36, OJ 1993 L199/1; Directive 93/37, OJ 1993 L199/54; 
and Directive 92/50, OJ 1992 L209/1).
Unfortunately, CCT fell short of the envisaged expectations 
and attracted widespread dissatisfaction from both the private 
and public sectors. The CCT became a self-perpetuating excuse 
for the poor quality of services delivered by local authorities and 
was deemed responsible for alienating local government from 
the public.
But who is to blame for the poor quality results in the delivery 
of public services? A management system such as CCT itself or 
the way such a system has been used by local authorities and
other public bodies? Irrespective of who is to bear the 
responsibility, CCT was bound to have a head-on collision with 
legal and socio-economic obstacles which entered its course. 
Although based on a well-worn and tried liberal economic 
model, the compulsory competitive tendering regime was used 
in order to maintain practically unsustainable budgetary 
allocations in local government spending, rather than to serve as 
a tool of modern, effective and efficient public sector 
management.
WHERE DID CCT GO WRONG?
Let us first, at least, acknowledge the merits of a system such 
as the CCT in the delivery of public services. Compulsory 
competitive tendering, by definition, introduces the element of 
price benchmarking in the process which, in theory, would 
produce two effects:
(1) the achievement of savings for the public sector; and
(2) the introduction of rationalisation dynamics for the 
industry.
On the other hand, competitive tendering has been seen as a 
safeguard for public accountability and a guarantee for openness 
and transparency in public procurement. The European public 
procurement regime is being based upon such premises with 
undeniably successful results.
Unfortunately, the above benefits have often been 
counterbalanced by a number of disadvantages attributed 
primarily to the practices of conducting competitive tendering 
and, to a lesser extent, to the system itself. CCT eventually 
became the vehicle to deliver public services in an era of strict 
budgetary constraints imposed by central government upon 
local authorities and the envisaged savings for the public sector 
have often materialised at the expense of the quality of public
Financial constraints
The financial constraints in local authority spending inevitably 
resulted in a rigid application of the CCT regime and the arrival
of a 'grocer's culture' in the delivery of public services. Local 
authorities disregarded the considerable flexibility built into the 
system, which relates predominately to the award criteria 
available to them, and awarded public services contracts solely by 
reference to price considerations. The award criteria include 
either the lowest offer or the most economically advantageous one, thus 
providing local authorities with a great deal of discretion in 
considering price and/or quality factors, when selecting their 
contractors. However, the delivery of public services under the 
CCT regime has been underpinned, in the vast majority of cases, 
by price considerations, thus resulting in the award of public 
contracts to the lowest price tenderer.
The myopic interpretation of the CCT regime and its 
intended objectives as well as the 'lowest offer mentality' have 
often been ascribed to the budgetary framework imposed on 
local authorities by central government. Nevertheless, this 
argument does not hold water when one considers that 
intelligent procurement systems such as partnering and 
public/private sector partnerships, as well as the availability of 
the award criteria described above, would normally stretch 
public funds when applied properly. So any shortfall of centrally 
originated funds could be tackled by maximising the flexibility of 
the system. Local authorities often failed to use all the means 
available to them.
Strictly speaking, it is the lowest offer mentality that should be 
attributed with the adverse effects of CCT and the deterioration 
of the quality of the services. The award of public 
contracts to the lowest offer rather than the most 
economically advantageous has resulted in 
disproportionate and inefficient risk allocation 
arrangements between the public and private sectors, 
which then in turn revealed poor end results and poor 
value for money to the public. The lowest offer in a 
public contract would normally reflect a relatively 
risk-free arrangement between the parties.
(SI 1981/1794)). Its relevance upon compulsory competitive 
tendering became clear when local authorities started testing the 
market in an attempt to define whether the provision of works 
or services from a commercial operator could be cheaper than 
that from the in-house team.
The notion of contracting out conceptualised an exercise 
which aimed at achieving potential savings and efficiency gains 
for contracting authorities by subjecting the provision of services 
to a compulsory competitive tendering regime. The application 
of the transfer of undertakings rules in contracting out cases had 
two important consequences for CCT: first, that the external 
bidder had to engage the local authority's former employees on 
the same conditions as they enjoyed under the authority itself; 
secondly, that the entire contracting out exercise, when filtered 
through the transfer of undertakings rules would, by changing 
the conditions of the workforce, render the achievement of 
savings for local authorities virtually impossible. The private 
sector could not realistically outprice the in-house team of a 
local authority when it was bound to observe constraints 
imposed by the transfer of undertakings rules. Thus, potential 
savings could not be materialised if labour as a factor of 
production (the employees of a contacting authority in a transfer 
of undertakings scenario) was to remain intact. The application 
of the transfer of undertakings rules had a catalyst effect upon 
the realisation that the objectives of the CCT regime were in 
reality incompatible and mutually exclusive with those stipulated 
in the acquired rights directive and TUPE regulations.
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The compulsion element
The compulsion element in competitive tendering has also 
created a hostile environment between the public and private 
sectors which is often reflected in the delivery of public services 
and deprives them of significant elements such as quality and 
innovation. The contractual relations between public authorities 
and the private sector through the compulsory competitive 
tendering have often been criticised for not giving the best value 
for money. The criticism has been mainly directed towards the 
cyclical demand structures of the procurement process, which 
often impose unnecessarily repetitive functions (particularly the 
advertisement, selection and qualification processes) and can be 
cost ineffective for local authorities.
ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE
Finally, a significant blow in the demise of compulsory 
competitive tendering was delivered through the application of 
the acquired rights directive (Directive 77/187 on the 
approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, OJ 1977 
LL61/26), as implemented by the TUPE regulations (Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981
THE BEST VALUE REGIME: AN OVERVIEW
The abolition of CCT and its replacement with the 'best value' 
regime as the management system available to local authorities 
and other public bodies for the delivery of public services should 
modernise, according to the government's intentions, the
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function of local government and improve the quality of its 
deliverables to the public. Best value is defined as:
'[a system of) ... securing continuous improvement in the exercise 
of all functions undertaken by a public authority, whether statutory or 
not, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.'
Best value pledges to provide genuine value for money for the 
public sector. It intends to deliver target-driven results in public 
services which will be quality-benchmarked rather than price- 
benchmarked and subject to external controls. Best value will 
capitalise upon the consensus amongst the stakeholders (local 
authorities, service users, private sector). Competitiveness, 
however, would be expected to play a major role in the new 
regime, as it is the prerequisite for. efficiency and effectiveness in 
the delivery of public services.
The much eulogised best value regime intends to emulate 
intelligent procurement systems such as partnering,
public/private sector partnerships and framework agreements 
which are the norm in the private sector and would normally 
stretch public funds. The main objective of such procurement 
systems and methods is to create a co-operative rather than an 
adversarial relationship between the public and private sectors by 
breaking the sequential nature of tendering and establishing a 
continuous delivery frame, within which quality, innovation, 
scale economies, savings and overall value for money can be 
achieved. Such arrangements would result in contractual 
relationships between the public and private sectors which are 
no longer the normal project-by-project arrangement of 
competitive tendering. It is expected that best value will remove 
the costly, wasteful, repetitive and antagonistic practices of 
competitive tendering, by establishing a relationship which 
introduces numerous beneficial prospects.
Best value places emphasis on qualitative rather than 
quantitative considerations and it vouches to deliver public 
services in an effective and economic way, by setting 
performance and efficiency targets in advance. Best value is 
determined to maximise the flexibility available to local 
authorities by introducing elements of advanced supply-chain 
management systems and procurement practices which are 
common in the private sector. For example, under best value the 
compulsion element of tendering for public services will be 
abolished and replaced with a selection process that can provide 
for a balance between quality and price. Such a system could 
result in savings which amount to up to 2% for local authorities 
and at the same time improve the quality of the deliverables.
BEST VALUE IN DETAIL
The best value regime imposes a statutory duty upon local 
authorities and other public bodies to deliver public services in 
an effective, efficient and economic way. Such a duty would 
probably have a complementary effect to the fiduciary duty 
applicable to local authorities' resources management. In fact it 
could be argued that it takes public sector management one step 
further as it introduces a detailed process in the dispersement of 
expenditure with regard to public services. Thus, accountability 
gains and, inevitably, accessibility to justice would result from the 
following key features:
(1) consultation between local authorities and all the relevant 
stakeholders regarding a wider range of public services than 
those covered by the best value predecessor (the CCT 
regime). The time-frame, thrust and effect of the above 
consultation would build up a corporate view of the deliverable 
services, in the sense that local authorities would need to 
demonstrate their performance on a cost-benefit basis;
(2) establishment of performance and efficiency targets for 
public services. The corporate view of local authorities in 
relation to the delivery of public services should be both 
quality and price-benchmarked by reference to centrally or 
locally prescribed performance and efficiency targets;
(3) quality control of public services delivered by local 
authorities through external government organisations (e.g. 
the Audit Commission) and certification of such monitoring 
processes;
(4) reservation of powers for the Secretary of State to rectify 
failure in the delivery of public services by local authorities.
Such powers represent the exception rather than the norm 
and provide for the Secretary of State the authority to 
intervene directly in a local authority and substitute its 
decision making, or even take control over the running and 
management of an authority which has failed to deliver best 
value. It should be mentioned here that such 'absolute' 
powers would follow a layer of preliminary intervention by 
the Audit Commission and the Local Government 
Association, where rectification measures should first be 
exhausted.
The procedural delivery of best value is not yet clearly defined, 
although it is expected that it will unfold in four stages. Local 
authorities would need to:
(1) determine whether a particular service is required and the 
relevant form for its provision;
(2) compare performances of that service amongst other 
authorities or centrally prescribed targets, taking into 
account all relevant indicators and the views of end users 
and suppliers;
(3) consult with all the relevant stakeholders (local taxpayers, 
service users and the wider business community) in setting 
specific performance and efficiency targets;
(4) demonstrate the optimal procedure for delivering the 
service to the public through a competitive process that 
guarantees openness, transparency and public 
accountability.
The procedural delivery of the best value regime reveals, to a 
large extent, striking similarities with the procedural delivery of 
the privately-financed projects through the Private Finance 
Initiative, where public authorities need to demonstrate, by 
using the so-called 'public sector comparators', the optimal way 
to deliver a project and finance its operation. Public sector 
comparators are indices which demonstrate value for money in 
public procurement by benchmarking variable parameters 
relating to qualitative considerations of a public contract (e.g. 
technical merit, quality' of deliverables, aesthetic reasons, 
maintenance facilities and warranties) against its pricing.
FURTHER READING
See Issue 13 (January 1999), p. 7, for an article by Professor Bovis 
on the PFI.
THE WAY AHEAD
It is expected that best value would certainly make an impact 
upon the system local authorities use for delivering public 
services. However, there are many uncertainties in relation to 
the thrust of best value, which have not yet been addressed by 
the government. The proposal was rushed through at the last 
minute in the Queen's Speech in December f 998 and both the 
public and private sectors need to see a detailed and concrete 
framework of rights and obligations arising out of the new 
regime. In particular, the forthcoming legislation, currently 
before Parliament for consideration, would benefit from 
addressing the following issues.
COMPETITIVENESS AND BEST VALUE
The detailed procedural delivery and the process of 
competitiveness of best value should be carefully set out. In legal
terms, what the government has so far produced, in relation to 
best value, amounts to a broad agenda of aims and objectives,
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targets and the involvement of the relevant stakeholders. The 
CCT regime which best value now replaces had laid down 
thorough processes and procedures concerning selection and 
award of public services contracts. It had also stipulated the 
necessary requirements local authorities and other public bodies 
needed to take to ensure high levels of competitiveness and 
transparency in contracting out exercises. Competitiveness as a 
component of best value should be better addressed in great 
detail. The reason is that local authorities have regarded it in the 
past as a threat to their vested interests. Competitiveness in best 
value would simply mean the degree and level to which local 
authorities and other public bodies are prepared to expose in- 
house teams to offers from external providers. Bearing in mind 
that there will be no element of compulsion, one could foresee 
some dangers in the implementation of best value by local
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authorities, although the Secretary of State has reserved absolute 
powers over the running and management of a local authority 
that might persistently fail to meet best value targets by avoiding 
competition.
http://www.parliament.uk/pa/pabills.htm
The full text of the Local Government Bill, as amended i
House of Commons in February 1998, is available at the above website
The relation and compatibility of best value with the EU 
procurement directives needs to be determined. Best value will 
certainly run parallel with the public service directive (Directive 
92/50). However,«it is not clear yet whether the two regimes are 
compatible or mutually exclusive, as the procedural delivery of 
best value would primarily determine the thrust and impact of 
the European regime upon it. The European public services 
regime subjects the award of public services contracts above a 
certain value ( 2 00k) to a rigorous regime of publicity', selection 
and qualification procedures and award criteria, primarily with a 
view to enhancing competition of services providers within the 
European common market and to eliminating discrimination on 
grounds of nationality: It could well be argued that the best value 
regime and the EU public services directive represent two 
different tiers in the delivery of public services by public 
authorities, tiers which focus at distinctive geographical markets 
(domestic and transnational respectively). However, the need for 
compatibility between them is eminent, given the fact that 
domestic regimes which appear inconsistent with European 
standards represent actual non-tariff barriers for the European 
integration process. Thus, the application of the best value 
should not constitute an evasive practice of the European public 
procurement regime.
TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS AND BEST 
VALUE
The impact and effect of the acquired rights directive 
(Directive 77/187) and the TUPE regulations upon best value 
are currently under investigation and should be clearly defined.
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The application of the transfer of undertakings rules in 
contracting-out cases resulted in a considerable rethinking of 
compulsory competitive tendering, particularly in the delivery of 
public services, to the extent that the contradiction and mutual 
exclusivity of the two regimes has led to the demise of the CCT 
regime by rendering its purpose and results inoperable. The best 
value regime seems to epitomise the concerns about employee 
protection in the event of a transfer of an undertaking relating to 
the provision of public services. However, the forthcoming 
legislation on best value (Local Government Act f 998) should not 
present local authorities with painful policy choices (the 
protection of employees or the achievement of savings) like its 
predecessor did. The choice of policies like those resulted, 
inevitably, in a heavy abuse of the CCT regime.
THE PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE AND 
BEST VALUE
A commitment, in principle, to the benefits of the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) was demonstrated by the government by 
the adoption of specific legislation (the National Health Service 
(Private Finance) Act 1997 and the Local Government Act (Contracts) 
1997) which enables local authorities and other 
public bodies to introduce the private sector as a 
partner, rather than as a contractor, in the process of 
delivering public services. Best value is, in theory, 
concerned with qualitative rather than quantitative 
elements in public services and as such it has many- 
attributes in common with the PFI, which envisages
o
the transplant of benefits of private entrepreneurship into the 
process of delivering public services.
CONCLUSIONS
The best value initiative can be seen as a genuine attempt to 
improve the delivery and increase the quality of public services 
local authorities and other public bodies deliver. It is a moderate 
and non-confrontational system which is based upon a balance 
between quality' and price of public services. Best value would 
result in best procurement practice for public services by 
elevating public consultation and quality' benchmarking as 
requisite criteria for genuine value for money in the delivery of 
public services.
However, there are certain dangers ahead, predominately due 
to the option available to local authorities to deliver public 
services without necessarily having recourse to a competition 
process. Case law and litigation have proved that the best value 
predecessor (the CCT) was heavily abused, notwithstanding the 
fact that the principles of transparency and competition were 
among its strongest points. Best value, as a replacement system 
needs to be free from any ideological, protectionist and 
preferential practices that haunted its predecessor. Local 
authorities and other public bodies need to avoid as much as 
possible the 'lowest offer' way of thinking when they implement 
best value. To use one of my favourite analogies, one cannot 
become a better driver by simply changing one's car! @
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